📚 The Psychology of Money, Morgan Housel

I can’t fully endorse The Psychology of Money. Though some of its theses resonate, most were fairly obvious to me, little really insightful. If you don’t know much about personal finances, you might find it informative (though I’d prefer A Random Walk Down Wallstreet, Common Sense on Mutual Funds or just the many videos from Ben Felix of The Rational Reminder); otherwise, skip it.

Ideas that I found fairly obvious: compounding is powerful; luck plays a huge part in life; saving matters; the biggest reason to be wealthy is to buy freedom.

One part I found mildly interesting: the reminder that the vast majority of our success often comes from a very small number of widely successful bets. Not very actionable for personal finances when the conclusion already is to invest in widely diversified funds, though.

Chapter 20, Confessions, includes a very questionable explanation. Rather than directly state that they are extremely risk averse, the author comes up with a contrived justification for their decision of keeping a significant percentage of their savings in cash —20%, though not accounting for their home. “We do it because cash is the oxygen of independence, and —more importantly— we never want to be forced to sell the stocks we own.”

Holding cash might make sense. However, the author’s justification —making sure they won’t have to “interfere with compounding”— doesn’t. They already don’t own the stocks this cash would have bought. Compounding has already been interrupted for the uninvested wealth: it wasn’t even allowed to start.

Fear of a significant market downturn —when an unexpected expense may force you to sell— is a sensible argument. The strained “don’t interfere with compounding” rationale is surprising. Per Peter Lynch, “far more money has been lost by investors preparing for or trying to anticipate market corrections than has been lost in the actual corrections themselves.” Housel isn’t timing markets, but they’re still paying a significant premium anticipating the unavoidable correction, and I would have liked to see them acknowledge it more explicitly.

Chapter 11, Reasonable > Rational —where Housel encourages us to aim for “reasonable”, rather than “rational”—, also didn’t sit very well with me. There’s nuance —what exactly do we mean by “rationally”?— but I reject the framing. Part is just terminology: Housel calls “reasonable” what I would call “rational”; “rational” what I would perhaps call “irrational” (denying your own emotions). Housel’s stance is, basically, mostly to give in, to a large extent, to your emotions; whereas I would take a different approach of acknowledging them and creating mechanisms to keep them in check. Rationality must remain our north star, while we acknowledge our imperfect foundations.

For example, Housel contrasts “the mathematically optimal strategy” with “the strategy that maximizes for how well you sleep at night”, as if they were different things. To be optimal, a strategy must cover many possible scenarios, not just average return. I maximize for sleep quality precisely by choosing the mathematically optimal strategy, which is congruent with my emotions.

However, this isn’t just nuance: the author presents their ideas on what to do when you have a fever (just take the medicine, even though fevers are, up to a degree, good for you). They are about the exact opposite of what I do! We should acknowledge our biases and find ways to ameliorate them, rather than celebrate them.

The two issues are somewhat related because I could see the goal of being “reasonable” used to justify holding cash because of a flawed rationale.

In conclusion, I found little new in this book, and I disagree somewhat with a few parts. They may seem like small bits, but they are somewhat at the heart of the matter.

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